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Abstract
In a strategic form game a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents (or
players) benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger
equilibrium notions can be defined by considering various restrictions on coalition formation. In
a Nash equilibrium, for instance, the assumption is that viable coalitions are singletons, and in
a super strong equilibrium, every coalition is viable. Restrictions on coalition formation can be
justified by communication limitations, coordination problems or institutional constraints. In this
paper, inspired by social structures in various real-life scenarios, we introduce certain restrictions
on coalition formation, and on their basis we introduce a number of equilibrium notions. As an
application we study our equilibrium notions in resource selection games (RSGs), and we present
a complete set of existence and non-existence results for general RSGs and their important special
cases.
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1 Introduction
In game theory the centerpiece of analysis is the notion of an equilibrium. In a game in
strategic form, an equilibrium is a strategy profile at which certain types of coalitions of
agents do not have profitable deviations. The strongest notion that can be defined along
this line is a super strong equilibrium: no coalition of agents benefits (in the Pareto sense)
from jointly changing their strategies. Note that in a game with n agents there are as
many as 2n − 1 (non-empty) possible coalitions if any coalition is deemed viable. However,
deeming every coalition viable and disqualifying strategy profiles as non-equilibrium may
be misguided. First of all, a super strong equilibrium rarely exists in a game. Therefore,
restrictions on coalition formation may be helpful to obtain existence results1.
This is the very same idea behind the well-known Nash equilibrium [16] solution concept
where only singletons are viable coalitions. In this paper, our goal is to fill the gap between
the less restrictive Nash equilibrium notion and the very restrictive super strong equilibrium
notion. The restrictions we enforce upon coalitions are not merely mathematical generaliz-
ations, but also motivated by many real-life examples.
Coalition formation may be restricted by coordinational, communicational and institu-
tional constraints.
- Coordinational: A deviation by a coalition requires coalition members to act in unison.
However, if coalition members are not familiar with one another, taking coordinated
action becomes difficult. Or, everyone may be familiar with one another yet agents may
find it more difficult to coordinate as the number of coalition members grows.
- Communicational: Formation of coalitions may require private communication. For
instance, imagine that agents communicate through a network where each agent is located
at one of the nodes. If some agent i wants to offer a deviation to another agent j, then
agent i had better make sure that his offer does not deteriorate any of the agents along
the path, since otherwise it will probably not reach agent j.
- Institutional: Even if there does not exist any coordinational or communicational bar-
rier between two agents to form a coalition, there might exists self-imposed institutional
constraints. In global affairs, it is not uncommon that a government feels compelled to
act in unison with its allies even if doing so comes at a great cost. For instance, it may
be forced to uphold trade sanctions on a neighboring country, causing much harm on its
economy. Or, a nation may refuse to engage in mutually beneficial relations with another
nation due to historical enmities.
Note that a full consideration of what restrictions on coalition formation may be reas-
onable in a specific real-life scenario is beyond the scope of our paper. We rather focus on
restrictions that are motivated by natural real-life social structures that may arise in various
settings.
On the basis of our restrictions, we define new equilibrium notions and then study how
they relate to one another, and when they are guaranteed to exist. Adding social structures
1 In defining our equilibrium notions we use the weak domination relation: a deviation makes coalition
members better off in the Pareto sense. An alternative approach is to define an equilibrium using the
strong domination relation: a deviation makes every coalition member strictly better off. Even when
the strong domination relation is used, an equilibrium rarely exists in a game if every coalition is viable
(the so-called strong equilibrium notion). For studies on strong equilibrium, its existence, and some
other related work, see [3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 15].
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to games is actually a growing trend in the recent literature. The following equilibrium
notion introduced in an earlier study is related to our study in particular2:
- Partition Equilibrium: In a partition equilibrium, it is assumed that the set of viable
coalitions is a partition of the set of agents; see Figure 1a. This notion generalizes the
notion of a Nash equilibrium and has been introduced by Feldman and Tennenholtz [5].
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
(a) A Partition Coalition Structure
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
(b) A Laminar Coalition Structure
Figure 1 Examples of Partition and Laminar Coalition Structures
Along similar lines we introduce in our paper three new notions of equilibrium, motivated
by real-life social structures:
- Laminar Equilibrium: In a laminar equilibrium, it is assumed that the set of viable
coalitions exhibits a laminar structure; see Figure 1b. This notion is mainly motivated
by institutional constraints as it relates to hierarchical communities in real life. For
instance, a military is divided into corps, legions, and brigades; a cabinet is divided
into ministries, departments, and directorates; a university is divided into faculties and
departments; and a company is divided into business units, divisions, and departments.
- Contiguous Equilibrium: In a contiguous equilibrium, it is assumed that agents are
distributed on a line and each viable coalition consists of some agents that are ordered
on the line subsequently; see Figure 2a. A contiguous coalition structure may emerge in
real life due to coordinational, communicational and institutional constraints as depicted
in following scenarios, respectively: i) Residents of a street are most likely to socialize
via neighbourhood, ii) When private communication between players are restricted in
an environment such as a queue, iii) When agents are positioned on left-right political
spectrum, coalitions presumably cannot be formed without intermediaries.
- Centralized Equilibrium: In a centralized equilibrium, it is assumed that agents are
distributed on a plane and each viable coalition corresponds to a circle on the plane
such that a coalition member lies at the circle’s center and the agents that lie inside the
circle are the coalition members; see Figure 2b. A centralized coalition structure may
emerge in real life due to coordinational, communicational and institutional constraints
as depicted in following scenarios, respectively: i) Residents of a neighbourhood are more
likely to socialize inside a closed distance, ii) When agents can only communicate within
a specific distance due to various reasons, such as wireless coverage, iii) When agents are
positioned on a political compass, the radius of a coalition corresponds to the tolerance
of its center (possibly the leader) to other political views.
Notice that the number of viable coalitions isO(n) in the case of a partition equilibrium or
a laminar equilibrium, and it is O(n2) in the case of a contiguous equilibrium or a centralized
equilibrium (where n is the number of agents). However, the number of possible coalition
2 For two other related studies see Ashlagi et al. [2] and Hoefer et al. [7].
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(a) A Contiguous Coalition Structure
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(b) A Centralized Coalition Structure
Figure 2 Examples of Contiguous and Centralized Coalition Structures
structures w.r.t. the number of agents for these notions are beyond the scope of our paper3.
In Theorem 1, we show that each equilibrium notion above generalizes the preceding one.
As an application we study the existence of the above notions of equilibrium in resource
selection games (RSGs), for the following reasons:
- RSGs fall into the class of potential games for which the existence of a Nash equilibrium
is guaranteed (see [14, 18]). Since the newly defined solution concepts are generalizations
of Nash equilibrium, existence of equilibria w.r.t. them is not guaranteed in classes of
games for which Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist.
- However, super strong equilibrium does not exist even in the simplest special cases of
this class of games. Hence, it is not trivial whether existence of equilibria w.r.t. the
above solution concepts is guaranteed or not.
- RSGs are a subclass of congestion games [18] which has immense number of applications
[6, 8, 11, 13]. Simple as they may be, RSGs capture the essence of various games
especially in the domain of routing games. In this setting, they are mostly known as
parallel-link networks. For recent literature on parallel-link networks, see [19] and the
references therein.
- Aside from their natural applications in transportation and communication networks
RSGs have been also shown to be useful in biology [12, 17].
- Not only the immediate previous work [1, 5], but also several other newly defined solution
concepts [6, 7] were studied for RSGs. So, RSGs are a benchmark to study existence
of equilibrium w.r.t. newly defined solution concepts ([6] uses the term symmetric load
balancing games for RSGs).
Our results in RSGs and their relation to the results in the literature are as follows:
Feldman and Tennenholtz [5] showed that a partition equilibrium always exists in RSGs
under the following restrictions: (i) if the size of a viable coalition is bounded by 2; or (ii)
if there are only two resources; or (iii) if the resources are identical. Anshelevich et al. [1]
generalized this result by proving a strategy profile that is both a partition equilibrium and
a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist in general RSGs. Our findings are as follows:
- In Section 3.1 and 3.2, we generalize the results (ii) and (iii) above in [5] to the notion
of a laminar equilibrium. We prove that a laminar equilibrium always exists: i) If there
are only two resources (Theorem 6), or ii) If the resources are identical (Corollary 12).
Note that RSGs with two resources is interesting in its own right. For instance, the
3 Partition problem was famously solved by Ramanujan; however, the number of possible laminar families
has been an open problem for years.
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well-known PoA = 4/3 result for selfish routing also holds for parallel-link networks with
two links [20].
- In Section 3.1, we show that an analogous generalization of the result in [1] is not possible.
Via an intricate counterexample, we show that a laminar equilibrium may not exist in
general RSGs (Theorem 8). Indeed, our counterexample shows that in general RSGs
there may not exist a strategy profile that is Pareto efficient, a partition equilibrium,
and a Nash equilibrium (Corollary 9). Notice that the main existence result in [1] does
not survive a minimal extension of their domain of viable set of coalitions, i.e., when the
set of all agents is added to the viable set of coalitions.
- In Section 3.2, we prove that a contiguous equilibrium may not always exist in an RSG
with two resources (Theorem 13). We show that, however, a contiguous equilibrium
always exists when resources are identical (Theorem 11).
- In Section 3.2, we show that, however, a centralized equilibrium may not exist even in
the very special setting in which there are two identical resources (Theorem 14). In the
two identical resources setting, Feldman and Tennenholtz [5] showed that a super strong
equilibrium may not exist.
Table 1 below summarizes these findings:
Solution Concepts
Resources
general two identical two identical
P artition +∗∗ +∗ +∗ +∗
Laminar − + + +
Contiguous − − + +
Centralized − − − −
∗ due to Feldman and Tennenholtz [5] ∗∗ due to Anshelevich et al. [1]
Table 1 Existence and Non-existence Results
2 The Equilibrium Notions
This section introduces our equilibrium notions in the context of a strategic form game and
then studies how these notions are related.
Let 〈N,S, U〉 be a strategic form game where N is a finite set of agents (or players),
S : (Sj)j∈N is the strategy space and U : S → R|N | is the payoff function. Agent j’s payoff
at strategy profile s ∈ S is denoted by Uj(s).4 A coalition c is a non-empty subset of agents.
Let P(N) be the power set of N . Then the domain of coalitions is P(N)−{∅}. Let P≥1(N)
denote this domain. A coalition structure C is a set of viable coalitions; i.e., C ⊆ P≥1(N).
Let Sc denote the restriction of the strategy space for coalition c. Let sc denote the
restriction of the strategy profile s for coalition c. That is, Sc = (Sj)j∈c and sc = (sj)j∈c.
Note that the strategy space can be written as (Sc, SNrc). The space Sc represents the
domain of deviations for coalition c. At s if coalition c takes deviation s˜c ∈ Sc, the resulting
strategy profile is (s˜c, sNrc) ∈ (Sc, SNrc). This is a profitable deviation for coalition c if
4 Throughout, ⊂ and ⊆ denote the “strict subset of” and the “subset of” relations. For a set X , |X |
denotes the cardinality of X . For a number x, |x| denotes the absolute value of x, and ⌊x⌋ denotes the
greatest integer smaller than x.
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for each j ∈ c, Uj(s˜c, sNrc) ≥ Uj(s), and for some j ∈ c, Uj(s˜c, sNrc) > Uj(s). That is,
the deviation makes coalition c better off in the Pareto sense. A strategy profile s is called
c-stable if coalition c has no profitable deviation at s, and C-stable if for coalition structure
C, s is c-stable for each c ∈ C.
Notice that a strategy profile is a super strong equilibrium if it is P≥1(N)-stable, and a
strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if it is P=1(N)-stable where P=1(N) = {c ⊂ N | |c| = 1}.
We now define the partition equilibrium which was introduced in the earlier literature, and
the three notions of equilibrium which are introduced first in our paper.
- Partition Equilibrium: A coalition structure C is a partition if for each j ∈ N , there
exists a unique coalition c ∈ C such that j ∈ c. Given a partition coalition structure C,
a strategy profile is a partition equilibrium if it is C-stable.
- Laminar Equilibrium: A coalition structure C is laminar if for any two coalitions
c1, c2 ∈ C such that c1 ∩ c2 6= ∅, either c1 ⊆ c2 or c2 ⊆ c1. Given a laminar coalition
structure C, a strategy profile is a laminar equilibrium if it is C-stable.
- Contiguous Equilibrium: A coalition structure C is contiguous if there exists a path
P : j1−j2−· · ·−j|N | (the vertices are agents) in accordance with C in the following sense:
for each c ∈ C, the agents in c are subsequently ordered under P . Given a contiguous
coalition structure C, a strategy profile is a contiguous equilibrium if it is C-stable.
- Centralized Equilibrium: A coalition structure C is centralized if there exists a planar
representation (φ, ψ), where φ : N → R2 and ψ : C → (N ×R>0), which is in accordance
with C in the following sense:
- For each c ∈ C, in the Cartesian space, ψ (c) corresponds to the following circle: the
circle’s center is at point φ(ψ1(c)) and its radius is ψ2(c).
- For an agent j, φ(j) lies inside the circle corresponding to ψ (c) (the boundary included)
if and only if j ∈ c.
In simpler terms, agents lie on a plane and a viable coalition consists of agents that lie
inside a circle with the restriction that one coalition member lies at the circle’s center.
Given a centralized coalition structure C, a strategy profile is a centralized equilibrium
if it is C-stable.
Let Csse = {P≥1(N)}. Let Cne = {P=1(N)}. Also, let Cpe, Cle, Ccoe, Ccee be, respectively,
the domains of coalition structures that are partitions, laminar, contiguous, and centralized.
Thus, a strategy profile that is C-stable is a super strong equilibrium if C ∈ Csse; a Nash
equilibrium if C ∈ Cne; a partition equilibrium if C ∈ Cpe, and so on.
Recall that our equilibrium notions are inspired by various real-life social structures.
So it could well be the case that they are not interrelated. However, we show that each
equilibrium notion above generalizes the preceding one, in Theorem 1, the proof of which
appears in Appendix A.
◮ Theorem 1. We have Cne ⊆ Cpe ⊆ Cle ⊆ Ccoe ⊆ Ccee. Also,
- Cne ⊂ Cpe ⊂ Cle for |N | ≥ 2,
- Cle ⊂ Ccoe for |N | ≥ 3,
- Ccoe ⊂ Ccee for |N | ≥ 4,
- for each C ∈ Cne ∪ Cpe ∪ Cle ∪ Ccoe ∪ Ccee, C ⊆ P≥1(N),
- P≥1(N) /∈ Cne ∪ Cpe ∪ Cle ∪ Ccoe ∪ Ccee for |N | ≥ 3.
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That is, centralized equilibrium is a generalization of contiguous equilibrium, contiguous
equilibrium is a generalization of laminar equilibrium, laminar equilibrium is a generalization
of partition equilibrium, partition equilibrium is a generalization of Nash equilibrium. Super
strong equilibrium is a refinement of all these equilibrium notions. The generalizations and
the refinement are nontrivial for |N | ≥ 4.
3 An Application: Resource Selection Games
A resource selection game (RSG) is a triplet 〈N,M, f〉 where N : {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set
of agents, M : {1, 2, . . . ,m} is the set of resources and f : (fi)mi=1 is the profile of strictly
monotonic increasing cost functions such that fi(0) = 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}. When q
agents use resource i, each incurs a cost equal to fi(q). Each agent tries to minimize the
cost it incurs. In the rest of the paper we fix the game 〈N,M, f〉.
An allocation is a sequence a : (ai)
m
i=1 such that: i) For each i ∈M , we have ai ⊆ N ; ii)
For every i, i′ ∈ M such that i 6= i′, we have ai ∩ ai′ = ∅; and iii) We have
⋃
i∈M ai = N .
Above, ai denotes the set of agents that are assigned to resource i at allocation a. Thus,
at allocation a, each agent in ai incurs a cost equal to fi(|ai|). Let A be the domain of
allocations.
The maxcost of an allocation a is the maximum cost incurred by an agent at a. That
is, the maxcost of allocation a equals maxi∈M fi(|ai|). The minmaxcost of the RSG, to
be denoted by α, is the maxcost of the allocation whose maxcost is smallest. That is,
α = mina∈A maxi∈M fi(|ai|).
Let qi = maxq∈Z≥0 fi(q) ≤ α. We refer to qi as resource i’s quota. That is, a resource’s
quota is the maximum number of agents that can be assigned to it without making its cost
exceed α. We distinguish between resources which can and cannot attain the minmaxcost
α. A resource i is a Type 1 resource if fi(qi) = α, and a Type 2 resource if fi(qi) < α.
Let T1 and T2 denote, respectively, the sets of type 1 and type 2 resources. Since the
minmaxcost of the game is α, we have T1 6= ∅. Also, for i ∈ T1, let βi = fi(qi − 1). We refer
to βi as resource i’s beta value. Note that for a type 1 resource i, its beta value is its cost
when the number of agents assigned to it is one less than its quota.
Note that an RSG is a non-cooperative game in the strategic form although its formu-
lation here is different from the formulation of a strategic form game in Section 2. Here,
agents’ payoffs are negative (i.e., they incur costs rather than receive payoffs) and an agent’s
strategy space is the set M (i.e., the agent selects one of the resources).
In this context, we continue to use the terminology in Section 2 in regards to coalitions
and coalition structures; i.e., c, C, P=1(N), P≥1(N), Csse, Cne, Cle, Ccoe, Ccee are as described
in Section 2. We also use the terminology in Section 2 regarding the stability and equilibrium
notions but with one exception: Note that in an RSG an allocation fully specifies the
strategies of agents. Therefore, in this context we speak of an “allocation” as a substitute
for a strategy profile. Hence, in this context, rather than a strategy profile we speak of
an allocation being c-stable or C-stable; or being a laminar equilibrium or a contiguous
equilibrium.
Also, in this context, we represent a deviation by a coalition c as a sequence (ci)
m
i=1 such
that: (i) c1 ∪ c2 ∪ · · · ∪ cm = c; and (ii) for each i, i′ ∈ M and i 6= i′, ci ∩ ci′ = ∅. That
is, a deviation is an agreement by coalition members on which resources they will use: ci
is the set of coalition members who agree to use resource i. We use a ◦ (ci)mi=1 to denote
the allocation that results when coalition c takes deviation (ci)
m
i=1 at allocation a: i.e., after
the deviation the set of agents that are assigned to resource i is (ai r c) ∪ ci. Also, note
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that a deviation is a profitable deviation if at the resulting allocation each coalition member
becomes weakly better off (i.e., the cost it incurs does not increase) and at least one of them
becomes better off (i.e., the cost it incurs decreases).
The notion of a super strong equilibrium is very appealing since it precludes profitable de-
viations by any coalition of agents. However, in most game forms a super strong equilibrium
is not guaranteed to exist. The is also true for RSGs; see the Example 2 below.
◮ Example 2 (due to Feldman and Tennenholtz [5]). Consider the RSG where N = {1, 2, 3},
M = {1, 2}, and fi(qi) = qi for i = 1, 2.
In this RSG there exists no super strong equilibrium. To see this note that: At an
allocation where all agents are assigned to the same resource, an agent that deviates to the
other resource becomes better off. In all other allocations, two agents are assigned to one
of the resources and one agent is assigned to the other resource. Wlog., let agents 1 and 2
be assigned to resource 1 and agent 3 to resource 2. But now the coalition c = {1, 2} has a
profitable deviation: When agent 1 deviates to resource 2, agent 1 becomes weakly better
off and agent 2 becomes better off. ♦
We next present a characterization of Nash equilibrium in RSGs given by [1].
◮ Theorem 3 (due to Anshelevich et al. [1]). In RSGs there always exists a Nash equilibrium
allocation. An allocation a is a Nash equilibrium if and only if:
- for each i ∈ T2, |ai| = qi;
- for each i ∈ T1, |ai| ∈ {qi − 1, qi};
- for some i ∈ T1, |ai| = qi.
Let allocation a be a Nash equilibrium. We need to designate the set of type 1 resources
that are not assigned at a up to their quotas: Let L(a) = {i ∈ T1 | |ai| = qi − 1}. Also, let
H(a) =M \ L(a). We refer to the resources in L(a) and in H(a) as low and high resources
at a, respectively. The corollary below immediately follows from the above theorem and it
will be useful later on.
◮ Corollary 4. Let allocation a be a Nash equilibrium. Then, |L(a)| =
∑
i∈M qi − n and
|H(a)| = m− |L(a)|. Therefore, the number of low and high resources are the same at every
Nash equilibrium allocation.
The rest of this section is divided into two parts. We present our existence and non-
existence results for laminar equilibrium notion in Section 3.1. We present our existence
and non-existence results for contiguous and centralized equilibrium notions in Section 3.2.
3.1 Existence and Non-Existence Results for Laminar Equilibrium
In this section, we present our existence and non-existence results for laminar equilibrium.
Our results resolves an open question in the literature. In their paper, Anshelevich et al. [1]
showed that in an RSG, for any given partition coalition structure, there exists a partition
equilibrium, as stated in the following theorem.
◮ Theorem 5 (due to Anshelevich et al. [1]). In an RSG, for any given partition coalition
structure C ∈ Cpe, there exists a Nash equilibrium allocation which is C-stable. That is, in
an RSG there always exists a partition equilibrium (which is also Nash equilibrium).
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They also conjectured that the following more general claim holds true: For any given
laminar coalition structure, there exists a laminar equilibrium. We first prove their con-
jecture for the special setting where there are only two resources. This result is presented
below, whose proof is given in Appendix B due to space limitations.
◮ Theorem 6. In a two-resource RSG, for any laminar coalition structure C ∈ Cle, there
exists a C-stable allocation. That is, laminar equilibrium always exists in RSGs with two
resources.
In the next section, we also prove that their conjecture holds for the special setting where
the resources are identical (Corollary 12), which is implied by the more general result that
contiguous equilibrium always exists in RSGs with identical resources. Alas, we show that
in the general setting, their conjecture does not hold.
The rest of this section is devoted to prove that a laminar equilibrium does not necessarily
exist in RSGs (Theorem 8). The example that we use to show Theorem 8 is an intricate
one, consisting of a large number of agents and resources. We present it below.
◮ Example 7. Consider an RSG as follows:
- There are n = 14052 agents and m = 2001 resources.
- Every resource is of type 1.
- The set of resources can be written as M =Mx ∪My ∪Mz such that:
- Mx = {x} and qx = 53.
- My = {y1, y2, . . . , y1000} where each resource in My has the same cost function, and
qy = 8 for all y ∈My.
- Mz = {z1, z2, . . . , z1000} where each resource in Mz has the same cost function, and
qz = 7 for all z ∈Mz.
- For all y ∈My and z ∈Mz, we have βx > βy > βz > fx (qx − 2). ⋄
◮ Theorem 8. In an RSG, for C ∈ Cle, it may be that no allocation is C-stable. That is,
in RSGs a laminar equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist.
Proof. In Example 7, consider the following coalition structure: C = {c1, . . . , c6}∪P=1(N)∪
{N} where the sets c1, . . . , c6 are disjoint and each has a cardinality of 14052/6 = 2342.
Note that C is laminar. We prove the theorem by showing that no C-stable allocation
exists in Example 7. By way of contradiction, suppose that in Example 7 there exists an
allocation a which is C-stable.
Note that by Corollary 4: |L(a)| = 1001 (= 53 + 8 × 1000 + 7 × 1000 − 14052). And
|H(a)| = 2001− 1001 = 1000. Since P=1(N) ⊂ C, a is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, using
Corollary 4, at allocation a there are 1001 low resources and 1000 high resources.
We divide the proof into six parts:
(1) We show that x ∈ L (a).
By way of contradiction, suppose that x ∈ H (a). Then, in My ∪Mz, there are 1001
resources that are low. Let i, i′ be two of them (i 6= i′). Consider the agents ai ∪ ai′ . Note
that |ai ∪ ai′ | = qi + qi′ − 2 ≤ 14. Let N1 ∪N2 ⊂ ax be such that N1 and N2 are disjoint,
|N1| = qi, and |N2| = qi′ . We define allocation a′ from a as follows.
10 On Existence of Equilibrium Under Social Coalition Structures
- Remove the agents in N1 ∪N2 ∪ ai ∪ ai′ from their assigned resources.
- Assign agents in N1 to resource i, assign agents in N2 to resource i
′, and assign agents
in ai ∪ ai′ to resource x.
(The assignments of remaining agents are the same as before.)
At allocation a′, the agents assigned to resource x are now better off (since x is now
assigned qx − 2 agents). All other agents are equally well-off at the two allocations. But
then a is not N -stable, a contradiction. Thus, x ∈ L (a).
(2) We show that |H (a) ∩My| ≤ 7. (Hence, |H (a) ∩Mz| ≥ 993.)
By (1), we know that x ∈ L (a). Then, at a, in My ∪Mz there are 1000 high resources
and 1000 low resources. By way of contradiction, suppose that |H (a) ∩My| ≥ 8. This
implies that |L (a) ∩Mz| ≥ 8. We define allocation a′ from a as follows. We pick 7 high
resources in My: Wlog., let y1, · · · , y7 ∈ H (a)∩My. We pick 8 low resources in Mz: Wlog.,
let z1, · · · , z8 ∈ L (a)∩Mz. We pick 49 agents assigned to x at a: Let Nx ⊂ ax be such that
|Nx| = 49. Then:
- Remove the agents in Nx ∪ ay1 ∪ · · · ∪ ay7 ∪ az1 ∪ · · · ∪ az8 from their assigned resources.
- Assign the 49 agents in Nx to resources y1, · · · , y7 such that each resource is assigned 7
agents.
- Assign the 56 agents in ay1 ∪ · · · ∪ ay7 to resources z1, · · · , z8 such that each resource is
assigned 7 agents.
- Assign the 48 agents in az1 ∪ · · · ∪ az8 to resource x.
(The assignments of remaining agents are the same as before.)
At allocation a′, the agents assigned to resource x are now better off (since x is now
assigned qx − 2 agents). The agents assigned to resources y1, · · · , y7 are also better off
(because they are now assigned to low resources for which the beta value is smaller). The
agents assigned to resources z1, · · · , z8 are equally well-off (because they are assigned to high
resources at both a and a′). The agents assigned to remaining resources are equally well-off.
But then a is not N -stable, a contradiction. Thus, |H (a) ∩My| ≤ 7. Hence, we also have
|H (a) ∩Mz| ≥ 993.
(3) We show that there exists c ∈ {c1, . . . , c6} such that there are at least 1159 agents
in c which are assigned to resources in H (a) ∩Mz at allocation a.
Above, by (2), at a there are at least 993 high resources in Mz. Since each of them is
assigned 7 agents, at a the number of agents assigned to high resources in Mz is at least
993 × 7 = 6951. But then by the generalized pigeonhole principle, there is a coalition
c ∈ {c1, . . . , c6} such that at a the number of agents in c that are assigned to high resources
in Mz is at least
⌈
6951
6
⌉
= 1159.
(4) Let c ∈ {c1, . . . , c6} be as described in (3). We show that there exists z ∈ H (a)∩Mz
such that there are at least two agents in c that are assigned to z at allocation a.
Note that at a the number of high resources inMz is at most 1000 (because |Mz| = 1000).
By (3) we also know that there are at least 1159 agents in c which are assigned to high
resources in Mz at allocation a. But then, by the pigeonhole principle, there exists z ∈
H (a) ∩Mz such that there are at least two agents in c that are assigned to z at allocation
a.
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(5) Let c ∈ {c1, . . . , c6} be as described in (3). We show that for each resource y ∈
L (a) ∩ (Mx ∪My), there are at least two agents in c that are assigned to y at allocation a.
By (4) there exists z ∈ H (a) ∩Mz such that there are at least two agents in c that are
assigned to z at allocation a. Thus, let j, j′ ∈ c be such that j 6= j′ and at a the agents j
and j′ are assigned to resource z.
By way of contradiction, suppose that there exists y ∈ L (a) ∩ (Mx ∪My) such that
|c ∩ ay| ≤ 1.
Suppose that |c ∩ ay| = 0. We define allocation a
′ from a as follows: Agent j is removed
from resource z and then assigned to resource y. It is clear that at a′ coalition c is better
off. But then a is not C-stable, a contradiction. Thus, |c ∩ ay| 6= 0.
Suppose that |c ∩ ay| = 1. Let j˜ be the agent in c ∩ ay. We define allocation a′ from a
as follows: Agents j and j′ are removed from resource z and then assigned to resource y,
and agent j˜ is removed from resource y and then assigned to resource z. Note that at a′
the agents j and j′ are equally well-off (they are still assigned to high resources) and the
agents in c that are assigned to z (j˜ and perhaps some other agents) are better off (because
z is now a low resource, and the beta value for z is smaller than the beta value for y). The
remaining agents in c are equally well-off. But then a is not C-stable, a contradiction. Thus,
|c ∩ ay| 6= 1. Therefore, |c ∩ ay| ≥ 2.
(6)We conclude the proof as follows: Let c be as described in (3). By (1) and (2), there
are at least 994 resources in L(a) ∩ (Mx ∪My). By (5), the number of agents in coalition c
that are assigned to resources in L(a) ∩ (Mx ∪My) is at least 2 × 994 = 1988 at allocation
a. By (3), there are at least 1159 agents in c which are assigned to resources in H (a)∩Mz
at allocation a. But then we get |c| ≥ 1988 + 1159 = 3147. This contradicts the fact that
|c| = 2342. ◭
◮ Corollary 9. In an RSG, there may not exist a Pareto efficient allocation a that is both a
partition equilibrium and a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. In proving Theorem 8, we work with the coalition structure C = {c1, . . . , c6} ∪
P=1(N) ∪ {N}. Here, the part {c1, . . . , c6} is a partition of the agents. The part P=1(N)
is the set of singleton coalitions. And the part {N} is the grand coalition. If every RSG
admitted a Pareto efficient allocation a that is both a partition equilibrium and a Nash
equilibrium, the RSG instance used in the proof of Theorem 8 would be c-stable for every
coalition c ∈ C. ◭
In light of our findings in Section 2, Theorem 8 also has the following corollary:
◮ Corollary 10. In an RSG, the existence of a contiguous equilibrium, or of a centralized
equilibrium, is also not guaranteed.
3.2 Existence and Non-Existence Results for Contiguous and
Centralized Equilibrium
In this section we present several existence and nonexistence results for contiguous and
centralized equilibrium notions. We first prove that a contiguous equilibrium exists when
the resources are identical.
◮ Theorem 11. In an identical-resource RSG, for any given contiguous coalition structure
C ∈ Ccoe, there exists a C-stable allocation. That is, in an RSG with identical resources,
there always exists a contiguous equilibrium.
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Proof. We proceed in two parts: First, in the identical resources setting we find a sufficient
condition for a Nash equilibrium allocation to be c-stable. Then, using this condition, for
C ∈ Ccoe, we construct a Nash equilibrium allocation which is C-stable. Our construction
is a simple one and it helps us find a Nash equilibrium allocation which is C-stable in linear
time.
(1) Let a be a Nash equilibrium allocation. Let c be some coalition of agents. We show
that a is c-stable if for every pair of resources i ∈ H(a) and i′ ∈ L(a), |ai ∩ c| ≤ |ai′ ∩ c|+ 1.
By way of contradiction, suppose that c satisfies the above condition yet (ci)
m
i=1 is a
profitable deviation at a. Let a = a ◦ (ci)mi=1.
Since resources are identical, their quotas and beta values are the same. Let their quotas
be q and their beta values be β.
Suppose that for resource i, |ai| > q. Then, it is clear that ci 6= ∅. Let j ∈ ci. Then at
a agent j incurs a cost greater than the minmaxcost α. Recall that at a Nash equilibrium
allocation no agent incurs a cost greater than α. Then, j is worse off at a than at a. This
contradicts that (ci)
m
i=1 is a profitable deviation at a. Thus, for each resource i, we have
|ai| ≤ qi.
Suppose that for each resource i, |ai| < q. But then at a, at each resource the cost
incurred is less than the minmaxcost α, a contradiction. Hence, there exists a resource, say
i, such that |ai| = q. But then, the theorem by Anshelevich et al. [1] and its corollary
(presented above) show that: the allocation a is a Nash equilibrium; |H(a)| = |H(a)|; and
|L(a)| = |L(a)|.
Let dX ⊆ c denote the subset of coalition members that are assigned to resources in
X ⊆ M at allocation a. Similarly, let dX ⊆ c denote the subset of coalition members that
are assigned to resources in X ⊆M at allocation a.
Since (ci)
m
i=1 is a profitable deviation at a, dH(a) ⊆ dH(a). Also, note that if dH(a) = dH(a),
we also get that dL(a) = dL(a). But then every coalition member is equally well-off at
allocations a and a. This contradicts that (ci)
m
i=1 is a profitable deviation at a. Hence, we
must have dH(a) ⊂ dH(a). Hence,
∣∣dH(a)∣∣− ∣∣dH(a)∣∣ > 0.
Note that
∣∣dH(a)∣∣ = ∣∣dH(a)∩H(a)∣∣+ ∣∣dH(a)∩L(a)∣∣ and ∣∣dH(a)∣∣ = ∣∣dH(a)∩H(a)∣∣+ ∣∣dL(a)∩H(a)∣∣.
Also, note that for a resource in H(a)∩H(a), the number of members of coalition c assigned
to it is the same at allocations a and a. Thus,
∣∣dH(a)∩H(a)∣∣ = ∣∣dH(a)∩H(a)∣∣. Thus, ∣∣dH(a)∣∣−∣∣dH(a)∣∣ = ∣∣dH(a)∩L(a)∣∣− ∣∣dL(a)∩H(a)∣∣ > 0. Hence, ∣∣dH(a)∩L(a)∣∣ > ∣∣dL(a)∩H(a)∣∣.
Let i∗ ∈ L(a) be such that the value |ai∗ ∩ c| is smallest. Let |ai∗ ∩ c| = s. The condition
above in (1) implies that for each i ∈ H(a), |di| ≤ s + 1. (Note that di = ai ∩ c.) Then,∣∣dH(a)∩L(a)∣∣ ≤ (s+ 1) |H(a) ∩ L(a)|. Now consider a resource i ∈ L(a) ∩ H(a). By our
choice of s we know that |di| ≥ s. (Note that di = ai ∩ c.) It is also clear that
∣∣di∣∣ = |di|+1
(because i is a low resource at a and it is a high resource at a). Then,
∣∣di∣∣ ≥ (s+ 1). Then,∣∣dL(a)∩H(a)∣∣ ≥ (s+ 1) |L(a) ∩H(a)|. Above we also showed that ∣∣dH(a)∩L(a)∣∣ > ∣∣dL(a)∩H(a)∣∣.
Then we get |H(a) ∩ L(a)| > |L(a) ∩H(a)|. Since |H(a)| = |H(a) ∩ L(a)| + |H(a) ∩H(a)|
and |H(a)| = |L(a) ∩H(a)|+ |H(a) ∩H(a)|, we obtain that H(a) > |H(a)|. But above we
showed that |H(a)| = |H(a)|, a contradiction. Therefore, allocation a is c-stable.
(2) We show that for each C ∈ Ccoe, there exists an allocation a such that a is a Nash
equilibrium and the condition in (1) is satisfied for every c ∈ C.
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Let C ∈ Ccoe. Let P be a path in accordance with coalition structure C. Wlog., let
P = 1 − 2 − · · · − n. To show (2) we will show that for C, there exists an allocation a
that satisfies the condition in (1) for every c ∈ C. We will construct this allocation with
Algorithm 1:
Algorithm 1
1: j ← 1
2: for i = 1, . . . , n do
3: assign agent i to resource j
4: j ← (j mod m) + 1
Observe that Algorithm 1 places the agents one by one to the resources; and when it
reaches the last resource, it rolls over to the first resource again. Therefore, the number of
agents on each pair of resources will differ by at most one at the end of the algorithm. Since
each resource’s quota is the same, this means that the above algorithm constructs a Nash
equilibrium allocation a where H(a) = {1, . . . , |H(a)|} and L(a) = {|H(a)|+ 1, . . . ,m} due
to Theorem 3.
Since for any pair of resources i ∈ H(a) and i′ ∈ L(a) we have i < i′, before the algorithm
assigns an agent to a low resource, it always assigns an agent to each high resource. Therefore,
before the algorithm assigns a member of coalition c ∈ C to a high resource i ∈ H(a) for
the first time, it might have been assigned another member of c to a low resource i′ ∈ L(a)
at most once.
On the other hand, after the algorithm assigns a member of coalition c ∈ C to a high
resource i ∈ H(a) for the first time, before it assigns another member of c to i, it needs to
assign a member of c to all other resources, since the agents in c are subsequently ordered
under P = 1 − 2 − · · · − n. Therefore, we have |ai ∩ c| ≤ |ai′ ∩ c| + 1 for any low resource
i′ ∈ L(a). This means that, at allocation a, for each coalition c ∈ C, the condition in (1) is
satisfied.
◭
In light of our findings in Section 2, Theorem 11 also has the following corollary:
◮ Corollary 12. In an identical-resource RSG, for any given laminar coalition structure
C ∈ Cle, there exists a C-stable allocation. That is, in an RSG with identical resources,
there always exists a laminar equilibrium.
Nonetheless, we show that contiguous equilibrium may not exist when there are two
nonidentical resources. We present this result below, whose proof is given in Appendix C.
◮ Theorem 13. In an RSG with two resources, for C ∈ Ccoe, it may be that no allocation is
C-stable. That is, in an RSG a contiguous equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist even when
the number of resources is restricted to 2.
We finally prove that a centralized equilibrium may not exist even for the two identical
resources case. Note that what makes this result interesting is that even though centralized
coalition structures contain O(n2) viable coalitions (instead of 2n−1 coalitions), equilibrium
may not exist in the two-identical resources setting, i.e., it strengths the non-existence result
of super strong equilibrium given in Example 2. We present this result below, whose proof
is given in Appendix C.
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◮ Theorem 14. In an RSG with two identical resources, for C ∈ Ccee, it may be that no
allocation is C-stable. That is, in an RSG a centralized equilibrium is not guaranteed to
exist even under the restriction that there are two identical resources.
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Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1. We prove the theorem in six parts.
(1) Cne ⊆ Cpe since P=1(N) is a partition over N . Let C ∈ Cpe. Then for any two
distinct coalitions c1, c2 ∈ C, we have c1 ∩ c2 = ∅. Thus, Cpe ⊆ Cle. We now show that
Cle ⊆ Ccoe by using strong induction on the size of the set N .
The base case (when |N | = 1) is trivial. Thus, we move to the inductive step: Suppose
that the relation Cle ⊆ Ccoe holds when |N | ≤ s, where s ≥ 1. We need to show that the
relation Cle ⊆ Ccoe holds when |N | = s+ 1. Hence, suppose that |N | = s+ 1.
Consider an arbitrary C ∈ Cle. We need to show that C ∈ Ccoe. To do that, we need
to find a path P in accordance with coalition structure C. If C = ∅ then any path works.
Thus, suppose that C 6= ∅. Also, note that for any path P the agents in N are subsequently
ordered. Thus, wlog. let N /∈ C.
Since C 6= ∅ and N /∈ C, there exists c ∈ C such that c ⊂ N and for each c˜ ∈ C, c 6⊂ c˜.
Let C1 = {c˜ ∈ C|c˜ ⊆ c} and C2 = C rC1. Note that |c| ≤ s, |N r c| ≤ s, and the coalition
structures C1 and C2 are laminar. Then, by our inductive hypothesis: There exist paths
P 1 and P 2, whose sets of vertices are c and N r c (in order), such that P 1 is in accordance
with C1 and P 2 is in accordance with C2. Now consider the path P : P 1 − P 2 (i.e., the
agents in c are ordered at the beginning as in P 1, and then the agents in N r c are ordered
at the end as in P 2). It is clear that P is in accordance with C. Thus, C ∈ Ccoe. Therefore,
Cle ⊆ Ccoe.
(2) We now show that Ccoe ⊆ Ccee.
Let C ∈ Ccoe. All we need is to show that C ∈ Ccee. Let P be a path in accordance
with coalition structure C. Wlog., let P = 1 − 2 − · · · − n. To ease exposition, we will
denote a coalition c ∈ C by [j′, j] where j′ and j are, in order, the smallest-index and the
largest-index agents in c.
To prove the desired result we first construct a list L whose elements are ∗’s and the
agents in N . We begin with the empty ordered list L = (). Then we expand L by inserting
in the list ∗’s and agents using the following algorithm:
For j = 1 . . . n:
1. Redefine L by inserting j at the end.
2. If there are no coalitions in C of the form [j′, j] where j′ 6= j, proceed with the next
iteration.
3. Otherwise, among coalitions of the form [j′, j] where j′ 6= j, let the smallest value that
j′ takes be j∗.
4. Let r be the number of elements (∗’s and agents) that come after j∗ up to j (including
j).
5. Redefine L by inserting r consecutive ∗’s at the end, and then proceed with the next
iteration.
We now show by induction that after the iteration for j, the list L is such that:
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- For each coalition
[
j, ĵ
]
∈ C where j 6= ĵ and ĵ ≤ j, the number of consecutive ∗’s that
succeed ĵ is at least as many as the number of elements that succeed j up to agent ĵ
(including ĵ).
The base case, when j = 1, is trivial: After the iteration for j = 1 we obtain that L = (1)
and the desired result holds vacuously. Hence, we move to the inductive step.
Suppose that the above statement is true after the iteration for j = s where s ≥ 1. We
need to show that the statement is true after the iteration for j = s + 1. Consider the
iteration for j = s+ 1.
If there are no coalitions in C of the form [j′, s+ 1] where j′ 6= s+ 1, after the iteration
the list L remains unchanged with the exception that agent s+ 1 has been inserted at the
end. The desired result then follows from the inductive hypothesis. (This is because the
part of the list that comes before agent s+ 1 did not change.)
Suppose that there are coalitions in C of the form [j′, s+ 1] where j′ 6= s + 1. Let j∗
and r be as defined in the algorithm. Then after the iteration the list L remains unchanged
with the exception that agent s + 1, followed by r consecutive ∗’s, are inserted at the end.
For coalitions of the form
[
j, ĵ
]
∈ C where ĵ < s + 1 the desired result follows from the
inductive hypothesis. For coalitions of the form
[
j, s+ 1
]
∈ C the desired results follows by
our choices of j∗ and r. Thus, the list L is as desired.
We now use the list L produced by the above algorithm to show that C ∈ Ccee: Consider
the following planar representation: In the Cartesian space the agents 1, 2, · · · , n are sub-
sequently positioned on a line, and the distance between agents j and j+1 is 1+(the number
of ∗’s in the list L between agents j and j + 1). For a coalition of the form [j, j] ∈ C, draw
a circle such that its radius is 1/2, and agent j lies at the circle’s center. For a coalition of
the form [j′, j] ∈ C where j′ 6= j, draw a circle such that its radius is the distance between
agents j′ and j, and agent j′ lies at the circle’s center. By construction of L this planar
representation is in accordance with coalition structure C. Therefore, C ∈ Ccee.
(3) We now show that Cne ⊂ Cpe ⊂ Cle for |N | ≥ 2. For |N | ≥ 2, observe that:
(i) {{1, 2}} /∈ Cne but {{1, 2}} ∈ Cpe;
(ii) {{1}, {1, 2}} /∈ Cpe but {{1}, {1, 2}} ∈ Cle.
Therefore, for |N | ≥ 2, Cne ⊂ Cpe ⊂ Cle.
(4) We now show that Cle ⊂ Ccoe for |N | ≥ 3.
For |N | ≥ 3, observe that: {{1, 2}, {2, 3}} /∈ Cle. Note that the path P : 1 − 2 − 3 is in
accordance with this coalition structure. Thus, {{1, 2}, {2, 3}} ∈ Ccoe. Therefore, if |N | ≥ 3,
Cle ⊂ Ccoe.
(5) We now show that Ccoe ⊂ Ccee for |N | ≥ 4.
Let |N | ≥ 4. Let C = {{1, 2, 3}, {2, 3, 4}, {3, 4, 1}, {4, 1, 2}}. To see that C ∈ Ccee,
consider the following planar representation: Agents 1, 2, 3, 4 lie at the four corners of a unit
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square. Each agent lies at the center of a circle with radius 1. It is easy to verify that this
planar representation is in accordance with coalition structure C. Therefore, C ∈ Ccee.
Suppose that C ∈ Ccoe. Let P be a path in accordance with coalition structure C.
Since {1, 2, 3} ∈ C and {2, 3, 4} ∈ C, it must be that under P the agents 1, 2, 3, 4 are
ordered next to one another. By symmetry of C w.r.t. agents we can assume wlog. that
P = · · ·−1−2−3−4−· · · . But then under P the agents in {3, 4, 1} ∈ C are not subsequently
ordered, a contradiction. Thus, C /∈ Ccoe. Since C /∈ Ccoe but C ∈ Ccee, we have Ccoe ⊂ Ccee
for |N | ≥ 4.
(6) Notice that for each C ∈ Cne ∪ Cpe ∪ Cle ∪ Ccoe ∪ Ccee, C ⊆ P≥1(N). This is
because by definition any coalition structure C is a subset of P≥1(N). We finally show that
P≥1(N) /∈ Cne ∪ Cpe ∪ Cle ∪ Ccoe ∪ Ccee for |N | ≥ 3. Suppose that |N | ≥ 3. The observation
that P≥1(N) /∈ Cne ∪ Cpe ∪ Cle is trivial and left for the reader.
Suppose that P≥1(N) ∈ Ccoe. Then, there exists a path P in accordance with P≥1(N).
By symmetry of P≥1(N) w.r.t. agents we can assume wlog. that P = 1 − 2 − · · · − n.
But then agents 1 and 3 are not subsequently ordered under P , a contradiction. Thus,
P≥1(N) /∈ Ccoe.
Suppose that P≥1(N) ∈ Ccee. Then, there exists a planar representation (φ, ψ) in
accordance with P≥1(N). Under (φ, ψ), consider the circles corresponding to coalitions
{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1, 3}. It must be that either a distinct agent lies at each of these three circles’
center or there is an agent that lies at the center of at least two circles. For this latter
case, wlog. suppose that agent 1 lies at the center of the circles corresponding to coalitions
{1, 2} and {1, 3}. Wlog., let ψ2({1, 2}) ≥ ψ2({1, 3}). But then agent 3 lies inside the circle
corresponding to coalition {1, 2}, a contradiction. Thus, a distinct agent lies at the center
of each of these three circles.
Wlog., let agents 1, 2, 3 lie at the centers of the circles corresponding to coalitions
{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 1}, respectively. For coalition {1, 2}, since 3 lies outside of the circle cor-
responding to this coalition, we must have ψ2({3, 1}) > ψ2({1, 2}). Using similar argu-
ments for coalitions coalitions {2, 3} and {3, 1}, we find that ψ2({1, 2}) > ψ2({2, 3}) and
ψ2({2, 3}) > ψ2({3, 1}). But then we get ψ2({3, 1}) > ψ2({1, 2}) > ψ2({2, 3}) > ψ2({3, 1}),
a contradiction. Therefore, C 6∈ Ccee.
This completes our proof. ◭
Appendix B
We now prove that laminar equilibrium always exists in two-resource RSGs. We first present
what we call “the two-color theorem of laminarity”(Theorem 15), the proof of which can be
found in the Appendix. It lies at the heart of the proof of Theorem 6, the main result of
this section. We believe that our two-color theorem may also be of independent interest, in
particular, in future studies on laminarity. In simple terms it states that for any N ′ ⊆ N
and any laminar coalition structure C, the set N ′ can be partitioned into two subsets of
about equal size (i.e., into N ′B and N
′
W = N
′
rN ′B where ||N
′
B| − |N
′
W || ≤ 1) such that for
each c ∈ C, the set of coalition members in N ′ (i.e., N ′ ∩ c) also becomes partitioned into
two subsets of about equal size (i.e., ||N ′B ∩ c| − |N
′
W ∩ c|| ≤ 1). (The agents in N
′
B and N
′
W
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are referred to as “black agents” and “white agents,” respectively, and hence is the name of
the theorem).
◮ Theorem 15. (the two-color theorem of laminarity) Let N ′ ⊆ N , |N ′| ≥ 1. Let
k ≥ 1 be such that |N ′| = 2k− 1 or |N ′| = 2k. Then, for any laminar coalition structure C,
the set N ′ can be partitioned into the subsets N ′B and N
′
W = N
′
r N ′B such that |N
′
B| = k
and for each c ∈ C, ||N ′B ∩ c| − |N
′
W ∩ c|| ≤ 1.
Proof. We first equip ourselves with some new terms and tools. Suppose that C is such
that N ∈ C and P=1(N) ⊆ C. For c, c
′ ∈ C, we say that “c is a child of c′,” and “c′ is the
mother of c,” if c ⊂ c′ and there does not exist c′′ ∈ C such that c ⊂ c′′ ⊂ c′. We recursively
define the sets C1, C2, · · · , Ct as follows:
C1 = {c ∈ C |c is not a child of any coalition c′ ∈ C } ,
and for 2 ≤ s ≤ t,
Cs =
{
c ∈ C
∣∣c is a child of some coalition c′ ∈ Cs−1 } .
Above, t is set such that Ct is non-empty and no coalition in Ct has a child in C. Note
that C1 = {N} and C = C1 ∪ C2 ∪ · · · ∪Ct.
For c ∈ C, let #(c) be the number of children of c. For #(c) > 0, we label the children
of c as c1, c2, · · · , c#(c). To make precise our labeling we use the following rule: among coali-
tions c1, c2, · · · , c#(c), c1 is the one that includes the smallest-index agent; among coalitions
c2, · · · , c#(c), c2 is the one that includes the smallest-index agent; and so on. Note that,
since P=1(N) ⊆ C, c = c1 ∪ c2 ∪ · · · ∪ c#(c). We are now ready to proceed with our proof.
We can assume wlog that N ∈ C and P=1(N) ⊆ C: If not, we redefine the set C as
follows: C : C ∪ {N} ∪ P=1(N). Then, when we identify the sets N ′B and N
′
W such that
the theorem’s requirements are satisfied for redefined C, clearly the theorem’s requirements
are also satisfied for C before we redefined it. That is why the assumption that N ∈ C and
P=1(N) ⊆ C is innocuous.
We prove the theorem using mathematical induction on s as follows:
Base case: There exist N1B ⊆ N
′ and N1W = N
′
rN1B such that
∣∣N1B∣∣ = k, and for each
c ∈ C1,
∣∣∣∣N1B ∩ c∣∣− ∣∣N1W ∩ c∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1.
Inductive Step:
(inductive hypothesis) For s ∈ {1, 2, 3, · · · , t− 1}, let NsB ⊆ N
′ and NsW = N
′
r NsB
be such that |NsB| = k, and for each c ∈ C
1 ∪C2 ∪ · · · ∪Cs, ||NsB ∩ c| − |N
s
W ∩ c|| ≤ 1.
(inductive conclusion) Then, there exist Ns+1B ⊆ N
′ and Ns+1W = N
′
rNs+1B such that∣∣Ns+1B ∣∣ = k, and for each c ∈ C1 ∪C2 ∪ · · · ∪Cs+1, ∣∣∣∣Ns+1B ∩ c∣∣− ∣∣Ns+1W ∩ c∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1.
Note that when the proof by mathematical induction is done, the sets N ′B = N
t
B and
N ′W = N
t
W satisfy the requirements in the theorem.
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Showing the base case is trivial: Clearly, C1 = {N}. Then, any two sets N1B ⊆ N
′ and
N1W = N
′
rN1B, where
∣∣N1B∣∣ = k, will be as required.
We now show the inductive step: Suppose the inductive hypothesis is true. Let Ns+1B =
NsB and N
s+1
W = N
s
W . If for each c ∈ C
s+1,
∣∣∣∣Ns+1B ∩ c∣∣− ∣∣Ns+1W ∩ c∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1, we are done.
Thus, suppose that for some c ∈ Cs+1,
∣∣∣∣Ns+1B ∩ c∣∣− ∣∣Ns+1W ∩ c∣∣∣∣ ≥ 2. Wlog, let ∣∣Ns+1B ∩ c∣∣−∣∣Ns+1W ∩ c∣∣ ≥ 2. (The arguments are similar for the case when ∣∣Ns+1W ∩ c∣∣− ∣∣Ns+1B ∩ c∣∣ ≥ 2.)
Let c∗ ∈ Cs be the mother of c. By the inductive hypothesis,
−1 ≤
∣∣Ns+1B ∩ c∗∣∣− ∣∣Ns+1W ∩ c∗∣∣ = #(c
∗)∑
l=1
(∣∣Ns+1B ∩ c∗l ∣∣− ∣∣Ns+1W ∩ c∗l ∣∣) ≤ 1.
Since c is a child of c∗ and
∣∣Ns+1B ∩ c∣∣− ∣∣Ns+1W ∩ c∣∣ ≥ 2, the above inequality implies that
there exists l ∈ {1, · · · ,#(c∗)} such that∣∣Ns+1B ∩ c∗l ∣∣− ∣∣Ns+1W ∩ c∗l ∣∣ ≤ −1.
Thus,
∣∣Ns+1W ∩ c∗l ∣∣ ≥ ∣∣Ns+1B ∩ c∗l ∣∣+ 1 ≥ 1. From above, we also know that ∣∣Ns+1B ∩ c∣∣ ≥∣∣Ns+1W ∩ c∣∣ + 2 ≥ 2. Thus, Ns+1W ∩ c∗l 6= ∅ and Ns+1B ∩ c 6= ∅. Let jW ∈ Ns+1W ∩ c∗l and
jB ∈ Ns+1B ∩ c. We redefine the sets N
s+1
B and N
s+1
W as follows:
Ns+1B : N
s+1
B r
{
jB
}
∪
{
jW
}
and Ns+1W : N
s+1
W r
{
jW
}
∪
{
jB
}
.
Note that:
- for c∗l , after N
s+1
B and N
s+1
W are redefined, the value
∣∣∣∣Ns+1B ∩ c∗l ∣∣− ∣∣Ns+1W ∩ c∗l ∣∣∣∣ becomes
smaller or the same as before;
- for c, after Ns+1B and N
s+1
W are redefined, the value
∣∣∣∣Ns+1B ∩ c∣∣− ∣∣Ns+1W ∩ c∣∣∣∣ becomes
smaller;
- for c˜ ∈ C1 ∪ C2 ∪ · · · ∪ Cs+1 r {c, c∗l }, after N
s+1
B and N
s+1
W are redefined, the value∣∣∣∣Ns+1B ∩ c˜∣∣− ∣∣Ns+1W ∩ c˜∣∣∣∣ remains unchanged.
Obviously, the above process can be iterated and the setsNs+1B andN
s+1
W can be redefined
until the inductive conclusion is satisfied. This concludes our proof. ◭
We next state Lemma 16, which present a characterization of the sort of profitable
deviations that may arise in a two-resource RSG in a Nash equilibrium when T1 = {1, 2}.
The proof of Lemma 16 is in the Appendix.
◮ Lemma 16. In a two-resource RSG, suppose that T1 = {1, 2} and T2 = ∅. Let allocation a
be a Nash equilibrium such that for resources i and i′, |ai| = qi and |ai′ | = qi′ − 1. Then, for
c ∈ P≥1(N), a is c-stable if and only if the conditions C1, C2, and C3 below are satisfied:
C1. if |ai′ ∩ c| = 0 then |ai ∩ c| ≤ 1;
C2. if βi = βi′ and |ai′ ∩ c| > 0 then |ai ∩ c| ≤ |ai′ ∩ c|+ 1;
C3. if βi < βi′ and |ai′ ∩ c| > 0 then |ai ∩ c| ≤ |ai′ ∩ c|.
Proof. Let T1 = {1, 2} and T2 = ∅. Let a be a Nash equilibrium such that |ai| = qi and
|ai′ | = qi′ − 1. We prove the two parts of the biconditional statement separately.
(only if)
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By way of contradiction, suppose that a is c-stable but one of the conditions in the lemma
is not satisfied.
If C1 is not satisfied, then ai′ ∩c = ∅ and |ai ∩ c| ≥ 2. Consider an agent j ∈ ai∩c. Note
that the set (ai ∩ c)r {j} is non-empty. Consider the deviation (c1, c2) such that ci′ = {j}
and ci = c r {j}. It is clear that (c1, c2) is a profitable deviation by coalition c at a, a
contradiction. Therefore, if a is c-stable the condition C1 is satisfied.
If C2 is not satisfied, then βi = βi′ , |ai′ ∩ c| > 0, and |ai ∩ c| ≥ |ai′ ∩ c| + 2. Let
|ai′ ∩ c| = k and |ai ∩ c| = k + 2 + s, where k > 0 and s ≥ 0. Let c˜ ⊂ ai ∩ c be such that
|c˜| = k + 1. Consider the deviation (c1, c2) such that ci′ = c˜ and ci = c r c˜. It is clear
that (c1, c2) is a profitable deviation by coalition c at a, a contradiction. Therefore, if a is
c-stable the condition C2 is satisfied.
If C3 is not satisfied, then βi < βi′ , |ai′ ∩ c| > 0, and |ai ∩ c| > |ai′ ∩ c|. Let |ai′ ∩ c| = k
and |ai ∩ c| = k + 1 + s, where k > 0 and s ≥ 0. Let c˜ ⊆ ai ∩ c be such that |c˜| = k + 1.
Consider the deviation (c1, c2) such that ci′ = c˜ and ci = c r c˜. It is clear that (c1, c2) is
a profitable deviation by coalition c at a, a contradiction. Therefore, if a is c-stable the
condition C3 is satisfied.
Therefore, if a is c-stable, then the conditions given in the lemma are all satisfied.
(if)
By way of contradiction, suppose that for allocation a the conditions C1, C2, C3 are
satisfied but a is not c-stable. Then there exists a profitable deviation (c1, c2) at allocation
a. Let a′ = a ◦ (c1, c2).
Suppose that for some resource i′′ ∈ {i, i′}, |a′i′′ | > qi′′ . Then |a
′
i′′ | > |ai′′ |. Since
|a′i′′ | = |ai′′ | − |ai′′ ∩ c| + |ci′′ |, we must have |ci′′ | > |ai′′ ∩ c|. Then ci′′ 6= ∅. Let j ∈ ci′′ .
Since |a′i′′ | > qi, the cost that j incurs at a
′ is greater than u. But at a the cost that j
incurs is less than or equal to u (because a is a Nash equilibrium; see Proposition 1). This
contradicts that (c1, c2) is a profitable deviation at a. Thus, it must be that for each resource
i′′ ∈ {i, i′}, a′i′′ ≤ qi′′ .
Note that |N | = |ai|+ |ai′ | = qi + qi′−1. Then the fact that for each resource i′′ ∈ {i, i′},
a′i′′ ≤ qi′′ , implies that either |a
′
i| = qi and |a
′
i′ | = qi′ − 1, or |a
′
i| = qi − 1 and |a
′
i′ | = qi′ .
Suppose that |a′i| = qi and |a
′
i′ | = qi′ − 1. Then it is clear that the sum of the costs
incurred by members of coalition c is the same at allocations a and a′. But then, if at a′ an
agent in c is better off (compared to at a), it must be that another agent in c is worse off at
a′. But then (c1, c2) cannot be a profitable deviation at a, a contradiction. Therefore, we
must have |a′i| = qi − 1 and |a
′
i′ | = qi′ .
If ai′ ∩c = ∅, then by C1 we get |ai ∩ c| ≤ 1. Since c is non-empty, we get |ai ∩ c| = 1 and
|c| = 1. But then (c1, c2) is a profitable deviation by a single-agent coalition, contradicting
that a is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, we obtain that ai′ ∩ c 6= ∅. Let |ai′ ∩ c| = k where
k > 0.
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Suppose that βi > βi′ . Consider an agent j ∈ ai′ ∩ c. Note that the cost that j incurs
at a is βi′ , and the cost that j incurs at a
′ is either βi or u. Either way j is worse off at
allocation a′, contradicting that (c1, c2) is a profitable deviation at a. Therefore, βi ≤ βi′ .
Suppose that βi = βi′ . Then, by C2, we find that |ai ∩ c| = s where s ≤ k + 1. Since
|a′i| = qi−1, |ai| = qi, and |a
′
i| = |ai|− |ai ∩ c|+ |a
′
i ∩ c|, we obtain that |a
′
i ∩ c| = |ai ∩ c|−1.
Then |a′i ∩ c| = s−1. At a the agents in ai′∩c incur a cost equal to βi′ < u. Hence, at a
′ they
cannot be assigned to resource i′ (where the cost incurred is u). Therefore, ai′ ∩ c ⊆ a′i ∩ c.
Then |a′i ∩ c| ≥ |ai′ ∩ c|. Therefore, s− 1 ≥ k. Since we also know that s ≤ k+1, we obtain
that s = k+1. Then ai′ ∩ c = a′i ∩ c. This means that at a
′, agents in ai′ ∩ c are assigned to
resource i and incur a cost equal to βi, and agents in ai ∩ c are assigned to resource i′ and
incur a cost equal to u. But then all agents are equally well off at a′ and a, contradicting
that (c1, c2) is a profitable deviation at a. Therefore, βi 6= βi′ .
Suppose that βi < βi′ . Then, by C3, we find that |ai ∩ c| = s where s ≤ k. Since
|a′i| = qi−1, |ai| = qi, and |a
′
i| = |ai|− |ai ∩ c|+ |a
′
i ∩ c|, we obtain that |a
′
i ∩ c| = |ai ∩ c|−1.
Then |a′i ∩ c| = s− 1. Note that at a the agents in ai′ ∩ c incur a cost equal to βi′ < u, and
hence at a′ they cannot be assigned to resource i′ (where the cost incurred is u). Therefore,
ai′ ∩ c ⊆ a′i ∩ c. Then |a
′
i ∩ c| ≥ |ai′ ∩ c|. Therefore, s− 1 ≥ k. But this contradicts with the
fact that s ≤ k. Therefore, βi < βi′ cannot be true.
Since our supposition that (c1, c2) is a profitable deviation at a always leads to a con-
tradiction, we find that when the conditions C1, C2, C3 are satisfied, the allocation a is
c-stable.
This concludes our proof. ◭
Before presenting and proving the main result of this section, we will introduce some
new tools.
The γ-value of an allocation a w.r.t. a coalition structure C, to be denoted by γ(a, C),
is defined as follows:
γ(a, C) =
∑
i∈M
∑
c∈C
1(c, ai), where
1(c, ai) :
{
1 if c ∩ ai 6= ∅
0 otherwise
.
Loosely speaking, the γ-value of allocation a is a cumulative measure of how “widely”
coalitions are spread to resources at allocation a.
The β-value of an allocation a, to be denoted by β(a), is defined as follows:
β(a) =
∑
i∈M
fi(|ai|).
That is, the β-value of allocation a is the sum of the costs at resources at allocation a.
We say that allocation a′ γβ-dominates allocation a w.r.t. C if γ(a′, C) > γ(a, C) or if
γ(a′, C) = γ(a, C) and β(a′) < β(a).
Let A ⊆ A be a subset of allocations. Clearly, there exists a ∈ A such that, for each
a′ ∈ Ar {a}, either a γβ-dominates a′ w.r.t. C, or a and a′ cannot be compared according
to the γβ-domination relation w.r.t. C. We refer to such an allocation a as a “maximal
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element in A according to the γβ-domination relation w.r.t. C.” Note that there may be
more than one maximal elements in A.
We are now ready to present the main result of this section.
Proof of Theorem 6. We show the existence of a C-stable allocation separately for the
following three cases:
- Case 1: T2 6= ∅.
- Case 2: T1 = {1, 2} and β1 = β2.
- Case 3: T1 = {1, 2} and β1 6= β2.
Let allocation a be a Nash equilibrium. (Its existence is by Theorem 3.)
Case 1: T2 6= ∅.
By Theorem 3, |T1| = |T2| = 1; and |a1| = q1 and |a2| = q2. But then, it is trivial to see
that a is a super strong equilibrium and hence it is C-stable.
Case 2: T1 = {1, 2} and β1 = β2.
By Theorem 3, either |a1| = q1 − 1 and |a2| = q2 or |a1| = q1 and |a2| = q2 − 1. Thus,
|N | = q1 + q2 − 1.
Let k ≥ 1 be such that |N | = 2k − 1 or |N | = 2k. Wlog, let q1 ≤ q2. Then, q1 ≤ k ≤ q2.
By Theorem 15, there exist N ′B ⊆ N and N
′
W = N r N
′
B such that |N
′
B| = k and for
each c ∈ C, |N ′B ∩ c| ≤ |N
′
W ∩ c|+ 1.
Let N˜B ⊆ N ′B be such that
∣∣∣N˜B∣∣∣ = q1. Let N˜W = N r N˜B. Note that ∣∣∣N˜W ∣∣∣ = q2 − 1.
Since N˜B ⊆ N ′B and N
′
W ⊆ N˜W , we obtain that for each c ∈ C,
∣∣∣N˜B ∩ c∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣N˜W ∩ c∣∣∣ + 1.
Therefore, for allocation a′ such that a′1 = N˜B and a
′
2 = N˜W , the conditions C1 and C2 in
Lemma 16 are satisfied while the condition C3 is not applicable. (To ease comparison with
lemma conditions, note that i and i′ in the lemma statement are 1 and 2 in here, in order.)
Therefore, by Lemma 16, a′ is C-stable.
Case 3: T1 = {1, 2} and β1 6= β2.
If a is C-stable, we are done. If not, we proceed as follows: We show the existence of
an allocation a′ such that a′ is a Nash equilibrium and a′ γβ-dominates a w.r.t. C. This
proves that a C-stable allocation exists because: If a′ turns out to be C-stable, we are done.
Otherwise, we can iterate the same arguments: We can find an allocation a′′ such that a′′
is a Nash equilibrium and a′′ γβ-dominates a′ w.r.t. C, and so on. Since there exists a
maximal element in the set of Nash equilibria according to the γβ-domination relation w.r.t.
C, our iterations must eventually yield a C-stable allocation.
Therefore, suppose that a is not C-stable. Let i, i′ ∈ {1, 2} be such that |ai| = qi and
|ai′ | = qi′ − 1.
By Lemma 16, there exists c ∈ C such that one of the conditions C1, C2, and C3 in
Lemma 16 is not satisfied. Since β1 6= β2, C2 is not applicable. Thus, either C1 or C3 is not
satisfied.
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Suppose that the condition C1 is not satisfied. Then, there exists c ∈ C such that
|ai′ ∩ c| = 0 and |ai ∩ c| ≥ 2. Let j, j′ ∈ ai ∩ c, j 6= j′. Let allocation a′ be such that
a′i = ai r {j
′} and a′i′ = ai′ ∪ {j
′}; hence, j ∈ a′i ∩ c, j
′ ∈ a′i′ ∩ c, and 1 (c, a
′
i) = 1 (c, a
′
i′) = 1.
By Theorem 3, a′ is a Nash equilibrium. Also, note that γ (a′, C) > γ (a, C) because:
- For each c′ ∈ C such that c′ ∩ c = ∅,
1 (c′, ai) + 1 (c
′, ai′) = 1 (c
′, a′i) + 1 (c
′, a′i′) .
(Because agents in Nrc are allocated to resources in exactly the same way at allocations
a and a′.)
- For each c′ ∈ C such that c ⊂ c′,
1 (c′, a′i) + 1 (c
′, a′i′) ≥ 1 (c
′, ai) + 1 (c
′, ai′) .
(Because 1 (c, a′i) + 1 (c, a
′
i′) = 2 and hence 1 (c
′, a′i) + 1 (c
′, a′i′) = 2.)
- For c,
1 (c, a′i) + 1 (c, a
′
i′) > 1 (c, ai) + 1 (c, ai′) .
(Because 1 (c, a′i) + 1 (c, a
′
i′) = 2 and 1 (c, ai)+ 1 (c, ai′) = 1.)
- For each c′ ∈ C such that c′ ⊂ c,
1 (c′, a′i) + 1 (c
′, a′i′) ≥ 1 (c
′, ai) + 1 (c
′, ai′) .
(Because 1 (c, ai) + 1 (c, ai′) = 1, and hence, 1 (c
′, ai) + 1 (c
′, ai′) = 1.)
Thus, as required, allocation a′ is a Nash equilibrium and a′ γβ-dominates a w.r.t. C.
Suppose that the condition C3 is not satisfied. Thus, βi < βi′ and there exists c ∈ C such
that |ai ∩ c| > |ai′ ∩ c| > 0. Let k be such that |ai′ ∩ c| = k − 1. Note that |ai ∩ c| ≥ k ≥ 2.
For each j ∈ ai′ ∩c, we define agent j˜ as follows: Let c˜ ∈ C be such that c˜ ⊆ c, ai∩ c˜ 6= ∅,
and there does not exist c ∈ C such that c ⊂ c˜ and ai ∩ c 6= ∅. Let j˜ be the smallest-index
agent in ai ∩ c˜.
Let Si =
{
j˜ |j ∈ ai′ ∩ c|
}
. Note that, since |ai′ ∩ c| = k− 1, |Si| ≤ k− 1. Let Si be such
that Si ⊂ Si ⊆ (ai ∩ c) and
∣∣Si∣∣ = k. Let Si,i′ = Si ∪ (ai′ ∩ c). Note that:
-
∣∣Si,i′ ∣∣ = 2k − 1 ≥ 3.
- and for each c′ ∈ C such that c′ ⊆ c and 1(c′, ai) + 1(c
′, ai′) = 2,
∣∣Si,i′ ∩ c′∣∣ ≥ 2. ♣
(This is because of how we defined j˜ and c˜ above: for j ∈ ai′ ∩ c, agent j˜ is selected from
within the set ai ∩ c˜ where c˜ ⊆ c′; thus, j˜ 6= j and j, j˜ ∈ Si,i′ ∩ c′.)
We now apply Theorem 15 by setting N ′ = Si,i′ : There exist N
′
B ⊆ Si,i′ and N
′
W =
Si,i′ r Si,i′ such that |N ′B| = k and for each c˜ ∈ C, ||N
′
B ∩ c˜| − |N
′
W ∩ c˜|| ≤ 1. Let a
′ be
the allocation such that a′i = (ai r c) ∪N
′
W and a
′
i′ = (ai r c) ∪N
′
B. Clearly, at a
′ we have
|a′i| = qi − 1 and |a
′
i′ | = qi′ . Hence, by Theorem 3, a
′ is a Nash equilibrium. Note that
γ (a′, C) ≥ γ (a, C
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- For each c′ ∈ C such that c′ ∩ c = ∅,
1 (c′, ai) + 1 (c
′, ai′) = 1 (c
′, a′i) + 1 (c
′, a′i′) .
(Because agents in Nrc are allocated to resources in exactly the same way at allocations
a and a′.)
- For each c′ ∈ C such that c ⊆ c′,
1 (c′, a′i) + 1 (c
′, a′i′) ≥ 1 (c
′, ai) + 1 (c
′, ai′) .
(Because Si,i′ ⊆ c,
∣∣Si,i′ ∣∣ ≥ 3, and hence, by application of Theorem 15 we obtain that
1 (c′, a′i) = 1 (c
′, a′i′) = 1.)
- For each c′ ∈ C such that c′ ⊂ c and |c′| = 1,
1 (c′, a′i) + 1 (c
′, a′i′) = 1 (c
′, ai) + 1 (c
′, ai′) = 1.
(Because at any allocation a single agent is assigned to exactly one resource.)
- For each c′ ∈ C such that c′ ⊂ c and |c′| ≥ 2,
1 (c′, a′i) + 1 (c
′, a′i′) ≥ 1 (c
′, ai) + 1 (c
′, ai′) .
(Because: If c′ ⊆ (ai ∩ c) or c′ ⊆ (ai′ ∩ c), we get 1 (c′, ai)+1 (c′, ai′) = 1 and the desired
result follows. If 1(c′, ai) + 1(c
′, ai′) = 2, then
∣∣Si,i′ ∩ c′∣∣ ≥ 2. (See the bullet argument
above indicated with ♣.) Hence the desired result follows by application of Theorem 15.
Note that β(a′) = α+ βi, β(a) = α+ βi′ , and since βi < βi′ , we get β(a
′) < β(a). Since
γ (a′, C) ≥ γ (a, C) and β(a′) < β(a), we obtain that a′ γβ-dominates a w.r.t. C. Thus, as
required, allocation a′ is a Nash equilibrium and a′ γβ-dominates a w.r.t. C.
This concludes our proof. ◭
Appendix C
Proof of Theorem 13. Consider an RSG where:
- N = {1, . . . , 6} and M = {1, 2}.
- f1 is such that f1(1) = 1, f1(2) = 2, f1(3) = 4.
- f2 is such that f2(1) = 1, f2(2) = 2, f2(3) = 3, f2(4) = 4.
Let C = P=1(N) ∪ {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5} be such that the coalitions are as illustrated below.
1 2 3 4 5 6
c1 c2 c3
c4 c5
It is clear from the figure that C ∈ Ccoe. In this game we will show that no allocation
is C-stable. By way of contradiction, suppose that there exists a C-stable allocation a.
Since P=1(N) ⊂ C, a is a Nash equilibrium. Using Theorem 3, we obtain that there are
two possibilities: |a1| = 3 and |a2| = 3 or |a1| = 2 and |a2| = 4. Note that at a, it must be
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that at most one agent in c1 is assigned to the high resource. Otherwise, at a coalition c1
has a profitable deviation: If one agent in the coalition deviates to the other resource, the
other resource now becomes high. Thus, the well-being of the agent that deviates remains
the same (it is still assigned to a high resource) while the other agent (now assigned to a
low resource) becomes better off. The same argument applies for coalitions c2 and c3.
Note that if resource 2 is high at a (i.e., |a2| = 4), it must be that c1 ⊂ a2 or c2 ⊂ a2
or c3 ⊂ a2. We showed that this cannot be true. Therefore, at a resource 1 is high and
resource 2 is low (i.e., |a1| = 3 and |a2| = 3).
Since resource 1 is high, we cannot have c1 ⊂ a1 or c2 ⊂ a1 or c3 ⊂ a1. But then, since
|a1| = 3, it must be that |a1 ∩ c1| = |a1 ∩ c2| = |a1 ∩ c3| = 1. Consider coalition c2. If
3 ∈ a1, we obtain that c4 is such that |a1 ∩ c4| = 2 and |a2 ∩ c4| = 1. If 4 ∈ a1, we obtain
that c5 is such that |a1 ∩ c5| = 2 and |a2 ∩ c5| = 1. Wlog., suppose that the former case is
true. But then at a consider the following deviation for c4: Each agent in c4 deviates to the
other resource. The deviation makes resource 1 low and resource 2 high. Note that at the
induced allocation the agents that deviated to resource 2 are equally well-off (they are still
assigned to a high resource) and the agent that deviated to resource 1 is better off (because
now it assigned to a low resource for which the beta value is smaller). But then this is a
profitable deviation, a contradiction. ◭
Proof of Theorem 14. Consider an RSG where N = {1, . . . , 5}, M = {1, 2}, and the two
resources are identical. Let C = P=1(N)∪{{1, 2}, {3, 4}, {5, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 5}, {5, 2, 3, 4}}. Con-
sider the planar representation illustrated below. In the figure, arrows indicate the circles:
An arrow’s tail indicates the circle’s center. And its length is the radius of the circle. (To
keep the figure simple, coalitions of size 1 are not indicated.) This planar representation is
in accordance with coalition structure C, i.e., C ∈ Ccee.
1
2
3
4
5
In this game we will show that no allocation is C-stable. By way of contradiction, suppose
that there exists an allocation a such that a is C-stable.
Since P=1(N) ⊂ C, a is a Nash equilibrium. Using Theorem 3 above, we obtain that at
a one resource is assigned two agents and the other one is assigned three agents. Wlog., let
|a1| = 2 and |a2| = 3.
Suppose that 1 ∈ a1. Then, in {5, 2, 3, 4} there is one agent assigned to resource 1 and
there are three agents assigned to resource 2. But then at a the coalition {5, 2, 3, 4} has a
profitable deviation: Wlog., let a1 = {1, 2} and a2 = {3, 4, 5}. At a, if agent 2 deviates to
resource 2 and agents 3, 4 deviate to resource 1, agent 5 becomes better off and the well-
beings of the remaining agents in coalition {5, 2, 3, 4} do not change. This contradicts that
a is C-stable. Thus, 1 ∈ a2. Now suppose that 4 ∈ a1. But then the preceding arguments
can be repeated for coalition {1, 2, 3, 5}, leading to a contradiction. Thus, 4 ∈ a2. Therefore,
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a2 is {1, 2, 4} or {1, 3, 4} or {1, 4, 5}. But then we obtain that for coalitions {1, 2} or {3, 4}
or {5, 4}, at least one of them is a subset of a2. But then at a this coalition has a profitable
deviation: If one agent in the coalition deviates to resource 1, this agent’s well-being remains
the same while the other agent in the coalition becomes better off. This contradics that a
is C-stable. Therefore, a is not C-stable. ◭
